The limits of anticruelty laws

A draft article by Arizona law professor Darian M. Ibrahim argues that anticruelty statues do not truly protect animals because they do not attack root practices of exploitation (hat tip: Animal Ethics). It is a powerful piece, firmly in the liberationist camp, and, consequently, pretty grim. As noted here, adjectives describing suffering or treatment are often rather subjective. Ibrahim, following Gary Francione, sees the focus on limiting suffering as indicative of a larger problem:

Because animal exploitation by its very nature, even done under the best of circumstances, requires the infliction of pain and suffering – often in tremendous amounts, and also often the death of the animal – the “excess” suffering involved is small in comparison to the amount of suffering required.

So the only effective anticruelty laws would be ones that categorically banned the use of animals, instead of regulating that use. Given the huge barriers to such legislative reform (most notably, people don't care about exploitation and industries care very much about their exploitation), Ibrahim also argues that the courts are not an appropriate venue for expanding these laws. The question that frequently arises when we read radical works is "until then?," that is, until exploitation stops, what is to be done? Don't companion animals deserve protection, even if others remained exploited?  We think so. Nonetheless, the article is well argued and deserves a read. Pennsylvania's new animal law journal, which will be publishing the article, is off to a great start.