In April, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Stevens, its biggest animal law case since the Lukumi decision in 1993. The case involved a First Amendment challenge to a federal law designed to stop crush videos, pornography showing small animals being crushed to death. The government in Stevens ran with the statute and prosecuted a seller of dog fighting videos. The Supreme Court, on an 8-1 vote, held the statute was constitutionally overbroad.
The majority opinion faulted the law for reaching animal-related acts that are not defined as "cruel." The law, as written, required use of a depiction of "animal cruelty," but defined cruelty to include any wounding or killing of an animal that violated federal or state law. The court imagined various scenarios where a depiction of a purportedly uncruel act (e.g., hunting without a license) would nonetheless violate the law. It found particularly troubling that a person could be convicted of possessing a video showing violence against an animal that was not in fact illegal in the possessor's state.
The Stevens court held out the possibility that a more targeted law--one "limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty"--could pass constitutional muster. Now comes news that the House and Senate have passed bills aimed at crush videos that ... actually target crush videos.
I've put together a table comparing the language in the statue now, in the Senate bill, and in the House bill. The full texts of both versions are at Govtrack.us. Both bills do a better job of defining the depictions being banned, though the Senate does a better job still by not requiring the depicted abuse to also be a state or federal crime. Both contain findings that draw parallels to caselaw on obscenity and child pornography. Both in fact require the depiction to be obscene; given the descriptions in the case, I'd hope all crush videos would qualify.
I personally find it difficult to get excited about these bills. They target a tiny segment of the pornography market and a miniscule portion of the animal abuse in this country. How little Congress cares about animals is evident in one change between the House and the Senate bills. The House bill recognizes a compelling interest in "preventing animal cruelty," a good policy goal, if one rarely acted on. The Senate bill, however, finds a compelling interest only in "intentional acts of extreme animal cruelty." What of "mere" animal cruelty? Well, some arguably cruel practices are expressly excluded from the statute's reach by an exception for depictions (even obscene ones!) involving hunting, fishing, and agriculture.
The one bright spot I see in the legislation is in the Senate's definition of the offense. It criminalizes the sale, distribution, etc., of depictions of animals being abused in several specific ways (e.g., drowning, suffocation), but also includes a catchall for depictions of severe bodily injury against animals. Severe bodily injury is defines not once but twice in reference to existing laws against humans. The law incorporates the definition in 18 U.S.C. ยง 1365(h)(3), which contemplates the injury of "another person" and "any individual." Most strikingly, the Senate bill defines severe bodily injury to include "conduct that, if committed against a person and in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, would violate section 2241 or 2242." As the links show, these statutes define the federal crimes of aggravated and simple sexual abuse. The Senate bill thus implicitly recognizes that harm to nonhumans is of a similar kind as harm to humans.
The Senate bill is also notable for its definition of the animal being depicted. While the current law and the House bill cover "living animals," the Senate covers "non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians." On the one hand, this definition excludes insects and fish; on the other, it acknowledges frankly that humans are animals of a sort. This language parallels some state definitions of "animal" which expressly exclude human beings. See this Maine statute.
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